



**PROF. DR.  
ALİ L.  
KARAOŞMANOĐLU**

# **ARMED FORCES AND DEMOCRACY**



**WISE MEN CENTER  
FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES**

**Translated By:  
Hacer ŐARTEPE**

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**Bilge Adamlar Stratejik Arařtırmalar Merkezi**

**Wise Men Center For Strategic Studies**

Mecidiyeköy Yolu Caddesi (Trump Towers Yanı)  
No:10 Celil Ağa İş Merkezi Kat:9 Daire:36-38  
Mecidiyeköy / İstanbul / Türkiye  
Tel: +90 212 217 65 91 Faks: +90 212 217 65 93

Atatürk Bulvarı Havuzlu Sok. No:4/6  
A.Ayrancı / Çankaya / Ankara / Türkiye  
Tel : +90 312 425 32 90 Faks: +90 312 425 32 90

[www.bilgesam.org](http://www.bilgesam.org)

[bilgesam@bilgesam.org](mailto:bilgesam@bilgesam.org)

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## **FOREWORD**

Making predictions for the future by closely following developments at home and abroad, conducting scientific research on bilateral and multilateral relations and the security strategies of Turkey, as well as on domestic problems in political, economic, technological, environmental and socio-cultural areas, providing also decision-makers with practical recommendations, policy options, and proposals in line with the national interests are all included in the foundation purposes of Wise Man Center for Strategic Studies (BILGESAM). BILGESAM is preparing reports to fulfill the purposes quoted above.

Turkey's agenda has long been preoccupied by the efforts of placing the civil-military relations on a democratic ground in a contemporary sense. There are certain critical points to be noted concerning civil-military relations. Civil-military relations do not pose a problem only for the countries that try to develop and consolidate their democracies, like Turkey. Contrary to popular belief, civil-military relations constitute a big concern for many parties. It is quite a complicated problem that, at times, also arises in the western countries, which are democratically developed ones. In such countries where democracy has prospered, this problem naturally has manifested itself in different versions and dimensions.

Within the scope of social and political sciences, a rather rich literature has been developed concerning civil-military relations. Likewise, scientific researches and publications are being conducted. Turkish scientists, alike, publish their research in prominent journals, thereby highly contributing to international literature.

BILGESAM, from its own original point of view, believes it is useful to prepare a report which proposes optimal ideas that could be accepted by anyone. I would like to extend my thanks to Prof. Dr. Ali. L. Karaosmanođlu who is one of the members of the Wise Men Board and prepared the report under the name of "Armed Forces and Democracy." I hope that it will contribute to the development of democratic values in Turkey.

Assoc. Prof. Atilla Sandıklı  
BILGESAM President



## **ARMED FORCES AND DEMOCRACY**

After the Cold-War, there have been radical changes in the international system and the international structure has, to a certain extent, come to be relative. However, division of power in the international community and non-centralized legal order still dominate their roles of being the most characteristic features of international relations. Under such an atmosphere, “security” (however much its content has changed) is still the “value” that should be primarily protected by individuals, societies and states and the lack of which is the source of concern. Therefore, communities of today’s world also accept the critical function of the armed forces. Furthermore, it has been much clearer in the post Cold War era that the security of an individual and the society is as important as that of the state’s security. In this era, it has also come to the fore that this security of the individual and the society could not be protected without the maintenance of the rule of law, human rights, freedoms and democracy. Therefore, the security provided by the armed forces does not suffice. Then security provided by the armed forces should be backed by democratic values, human rights freedoms and the rule of law. However, the history has showed that the armed forces, in performing its mission of protection, has from time to time easily violated democratic values, human rights, freedoms and the principle of rule of law. In this sense, for the protection of the democratic values and thus for the maintenance of individual and social security, it seems compulsory for the military forces to adhere to the civil authority within the democratic regime and to be controlled by the civil authority alike. In other words, civil-military relations should be conducted on a democratic ground.

The problem in civil-military relations is not particular to Turkey or to the countries whose democracy has not yet developed. It is a general problem that manifests itself in different versions in the liberal democracies of the West. The problem in civil-military relations has been much more apparent, especially in America and England with regards to the Iraq and Afghanistan interventions. It would be of use to mention how the theory of political science refers to the importance and the complexity of this problem. According to Peter D. Feaver,<sup>1</sup> one of the pioneering names in this scope, the armed forces totally differs from the other state institutions, highlighting where the problem starts. The armed forces is different, as it can be understood from its name of being “armed.” Its big potential of power cannot be compared to any other institution or even to the civil democratic government. Hence, the civil government’s relations with the armed forces cannot be similar to its relations with any other public institutions, such as its relations with any directorate general. The final word in democratic regimes always belongs to the one who comes to power through elections. However, the armed forces has its own hierarchy, disciplinary rules, rules of promotion and assignment and the discretionary power in this scope. The problem is related to the boundaries of this autonomous field.

As mentioned above, both a society and a political regime need protection from threats. The armed forces has been established by society and the state with this purpose of protection and practice has maintained itself up until now. For the same end, armed forces should be powerful so that they can effectively maintain their role of protection. Nevertheless, such powerful armed forces may sometimes pose a threat for the society and the politics. Soldiers should be powerful, however, they should not exercise power over the society and the politics and even make its existence so explicit. Feaver calls this dilemma “the civil-military problematique.” Then, how can the civil ruling party and the soldier cope with this dilemma, which manifests itself almost in any society in various versions and dimensions?

Turkey’s democracy has not been consolidated since the second half of the 1940s, when Turkey adopted the multiple-party system. One of the most important reasons of this lies under the fact that the civil-military relations have not been able to be established on a democratic ground. Even though the Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) has never categorically objected to democracy, it has been one of the important players of the Turkish political life. The Turkish Armed Forces has always been the item of the ‘political’ agenda and exerted its authority over Turkey’s politics either through the coup d’états, juntas within itself, interventions in the politics by some reasons or through its wide-ranging autonomous sphere of influence –which cannot be seen in any other democracy.

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<sup>1</sup> Peter D. Feaver, *Armed Servants: Agency, Oversight, and Civil-Military Relations* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2003), 4-7.

The political role of the Turkish Armed Forces in the modernization history of Turkey could be traced back to the mid- 19<sup>th</sup> century. The modernization movement gaining momentum in the 19<sup>th</sup> century has placed the armed forces at the center of this movement and given birth to the domination of a political-military culture. The Republic of Turkey has inherited this interventionist culture and especially after the acceptance of the multiple-party system, the military interventionism has still maintained its role of being part of the political life. Therefore, transition into democracy has not been able to come into being in Turkey's civil-military relations.

After the Second World War, democracy has come to be the sine qua non of the modernization (in Atatürk's terms with the main goal being "the contemporary civilization"). This, in turn, has brought the Turkish Armed Forces into a deadlock. How could the armed forces (which regarded itself as the protector of the modernization) have protected the products of the Republic (mainly being nation-state and secularism) within the multiple-party democratic regime? How could it be able to harmonize this mission of protection with democracy, the new element of the modernization? TAF has been striving for the solution of this dilemma since 1945. Its failure in overcoming this dilemma has both inhibited the consolidation of the multiple-party regime and led to failures within the TAF, thereby impairing the professionalism of the institution.

In Turkey, civilians have also played a big role in slowing the democratization process. At times, politicians and their political parties have displayed anti-democratic attitudes. Evading responsibility, they assigned their responsibility to the soldier. They did not pay much attention to the fields related to the soldier and did not need to improve themselves in this sense. More important is the fact that there have always been civilians who tried to influence the soldier "subjectively" in Turkey. Some political parties, ideological groups, media groups, university members and non-governmental organizations have always tended to influence and use the TAF in accordance with their own political views and ideologies. They have even encouraged the TAF to be included in the politics. In Huntington's terms, civilian efforts which aspire to attain the "subjective control" of the soldier have always appeared. Parallel to this however, "objective control" of the soldier has never been settled.<sup>2</sup>

The Turkish Armed Forces (TAF), institutionally and principle-wise, has never objected to the democratic regime. It could even be said that the Turkish Armed Forces has regarded itself as the protector of both the Turkish version of secularism and the multiple-party regime. After seizing the control of the administrations, it immediately assigned the power to the civil governments and passed into the multiple-party regime. This is one of the important

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<sup>2</sup> Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1957), 80-85.

aspects that make the situation in Turkey different from the military dictatorships of Southern America and the Middle East. However, the Turkish Armed Forces, after each coup d'état, has expanded its autonomous sphere of influence by making changes in the constitution and legislation as of 1960, thereby contracting that of the civilian authority. Thus, except for the Turgut Özal period, the military control over the civil life has increasingly grown and survived up until 2000s.

Civil-military relations have developed in tandem with the democratic multiple-party regimes both in Portugal, Spain, in the dictatorships of South America and later in the totalitarian regimes of the countries within the Soviet Union and the Eastern Europe. In such countries, democratization has pursued a linear process. Narcis Serra, who was the Spanish Minister of Defense during Spain's transition into democracy from Franco regime, touches on this linear process when he talks about his Spain experiences.<sup>3</sup> On the contrary, democratization of the civil-military relations in Turkey has not been parallel to the democratic multiple-party regime. But instead, democratization has undergone a non-linear process rife with various dilemmas, and other ups and downs, continuing to develop in this manner.

This study does not aim at analyzing Turkey from the perspective of the periods that have clear-cut differences from each other. Nevertheless, this study may sometimes give some room to two different stages which may from time to time overlap or to reforms of two different generations.<sup>4</sup> The first generation reforms relate to the change of the existing institutions and rules (legislation) and to the preparation of a normative ground that fits in with the democratic values. This normative ground proposes the superiority of the civil authority that has come to power through elections and the monitoring of the military organization by this civil authority. As for the second generation reforms, they represent a broader and deeper approach. They relate to the effective implementation of the first generation reforms and to the realization of their purposes. To actualize this, the political staff's knowledge concerning the military should be increased, civil bureaucrats should be trained, the required transparency should be ensured within this scope and the media, think-tanks, and public opinion should be able to contribute to the effective and informative debates related to the military. Within this framework, along with the emphasis on the principles of democracy, a special emphasis should be attached to the principles of "effectiveness" and "efficiency"<sup>5</sup> for the military activities. In this second stage, along with

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<sup>3</sup> Narcis Serra, *The Military Transition: Democratic Reform of the Armed Forces* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010).

<sup>4</sup> Andrew Cottey, Timothy Edmunds, and Anthony Forster, "The Second Generation Problematic: Rethinking Democracy and Civil-Military Relations", *Armed Forces and Society*, vol.29, no.1 (Fall 2002), 31-56.

<sup>5</sup> "Effectiveness" refers to the armed forces' being active and ready for service and for the realization of the expected result from a certain operation. "Efficiency" refers to the efficiency ratio in parallel with the work

the civil-military relations, restructuring of the whole security sector should be suggested. Since the restructuring of the whole security sector requires a more comprehensive study, this subject is not included in this report.

First generation reforms are necessary for the civil-military relations to evolve from authoritarian and “custodian” grounds into a democratic one. Yet, they are not adequate for the establishment of a fully functional democratic order. For a real democratic civil-military regime, realization of the second generation reforms should also be ensured. The first generation could be defined as “transition into democracy” while the second generation could be described as the “consolidation of democracy.” It has been sixty years since Turkey adopted the multiple-party regime and political parties started to be designated through elections. However, Turkey has not yet been able to actualize even the transition into democracy in civil-military relations (in other words, the first generation reforms).

Especially as of 2002, many reforms have been performed in this field in Turkey. Within this scope, in order to restrict the autonomous sphere of the soldier and ensure the civil authority’s control over the soldier, in addition to reducing the influence of the soldier on politics and the society, remarkable changes have been executed in the constitution and the legislation. Despite the reforms performed, there is still a need for many changes so that the civil-military relations could be based on a more democratic ground in the country. The steps that should be taken for the constitution and the other legislation could fall into four groups. First comes the clarification of the clauses in the constitution and in other legislation. For instance, there should be a clause indicating the superiority of the civil authority for both internal and external security, be it in time of war or peace, and without any uncertainty showing that the civil authority has the authority and the responsibility for administration and control. Secondly, the control of the Turkish Grand National Assembly on the acts and defense budget of the armed forces should be ensured. Thirdly, the Turkish General Staff and the Service Commands should be unified with the executive. Fourthly, it is utmost importance to constrain the military jurisdiction and remove the janus-headed judiciary.

## **The Basic Principles of Democratic Civil-Military Relations**

Since the start of the Cold War, Turkey has been the member of the international organizations which were founded by democratic countries of the Western world. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), and the European Council are among the most important ones in this sense. Besides, Turkey has initiated membership talks with the EU and is a candidate member. During the Cold War Era, civil democratic control on the military was not among the

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conducted or the energy exerted; in other words, refers to the achievement of the expected result with the use of minimum sources.

important priorities of these institutions. The military governments in Turkey, Portugal and Greece, all of which are members of NATO, were regarded by these international organizations only on the basis of their geopolitical importance. What's more, military interventions in the politics, even its seizure of power, had somehow been welcomed. In the post-Cold War, however, in order to base the relations of the security sectors and the civil-military relations of the countries (that are the members or to be the members of these international organizations) on a democratic ground, the OSCE, NATO and the European Council have adopted some fundamental norms which are binding upon politics and the law. Turkey is also among the countries that have accepted the documents that include these norms.

One of these documents is the one that was accepted by OSCE in Budapest on the 6<sup>th</sup> of December 1994, under the name "Towards a Genuine Partnership in a New Era." The fourth chapter of this document relates to building civil-military relations on a democratic ground and it was entitled as the *OSCE Code of Conduct on Politics-Military Aspects of Security*.<sup>6</sup> The report reflects the "Code of Conduct" in a quite detailed way. For instance, two leading codes are stated as follows:

"Each member country has to keep its military, paramilitary and security forces under control through the institutions that have legitimacy in the constitution...The member countries should not show tolerance towards the military force which is ...uncontrollable and ... does not give account and they should not support them."

"Armed forces should not be used with the purpose of preventing human rights from being in compliance with peace and law or with the purpose of depriving individuals of religious, national, cultural and ethnic identities."

The above-mentioned Codes of Conduct have also been adopted and developed by NATO. These codes of conducts have also been implemented in the programs of Partnership for Peace (PfP) for the new members and partners so that they can comply with NATO. Furthermore, in a broader sense, the reform in security sector (mainly being the democratization of the civil-military relations) has come to become one of the important activities of NATO.<sup>7</sup> NATO attaches special emphasis to this whenever possible. For instance,

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<sup>6</sup> *OSCE Code of Conduct on Politics-Military Aspects of Security*, Programme for Immediate Action Series, No.7 (3December 1994, Doc. F5C/1/95). See also Alexandre Zambert, *Implementation of Democratic Control of Armed Forces in the OSCE Region*, DCAF Occasional Paper, no. 11 (July 2006), 9-10.

<sup>7</sup> NATO has adopted the OSCE's "Code of Conducts" and has also carried out many works with the purpose of the democratization of the civil-military relations. For instance, see NACC/Pfp (C)N(95)4, 31 October 1995. NACC/Pfp(PMSC)N(96)9, 11 June 1996; NAC/Pfp(PMSC)N(96)17,4 November 1996 for some of the works of the "Steering Committee of the Civil-Military Relations" which was established within the framework of the

in the documents that were accepted in the NATO Summit held in July of 2004 in Istanbul, NATO touched on the utmost importance of the development of the defense institutions that are “adequate” and “democratically responsible,” on the democratic control of the armed forces and the transparency in its defense planning and budgeting. Likewise, it reiterated the relationship between these, along with peace and stability.<sup>8</sup>

NATO is seen by its members as an organization that goes beyond a military alliance, in a classical sense. It is regarded as a security group consisting of the states who have adopted democratic values and norms. This characteristic feature of the North Atlantic Alliance has laid the groundwork for a joint democratic identity.<sup>9</sup> For the Turkish governments and the command echelon of the TAF as well, despite some exceptions, NATO has been the most functional bridge connecting Turkey to the world of the Western nations. The end of the Cold War has not changed this reality either, but instead, has made it much more remarkable.

However, the fact that Turkey has still not been able to democratize its civil-military relations stands as an outstanding contradiction.

The same case applies to the European Council (of which Turkey has been its a member since 1949). Within this organization as well, Turkey has been the country which hasn't been able to democratically keep its armed forces under control. The Venice Commission, one of the secondary branches of the European Council, has prepared a detailed report on the democratic control of the armed forces and this report was accepted by the Council on April 23<sup>rd</sup>, 2008.<sup>10</sup> Turkey's current situation is far from meeting the standards mentioned in the report.

After Turkey's EU membership, civil-military problems have been much stronger and apparent. Within the scope of the Copenhagen criteria, harmonization with the EU is regarded as a pre-condition and the civil-military relations are assessed from this perspective. The progress reports of the European Council are the examples of such

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programs, North Atlantic Cooperation Council and Partnership for Peace. See also “Perspectives on Democratic Civil-Military Relations and Reform,” Speech by NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson, The Hague, 9 May 2001, 28-29.

<sup>8</sup> For the approved documents concerning the civil-military relations at NATO Istanbul Summit on 28-29 July of 2004, see “The Euro-Atlantic Partnership-Reforming and Renewal”, parag. 2/2 and 4/1; “Expanded Framework for the Mediterranean Dialogue”, page.5; and “Istanbul Cooperation Initiative”, parag.7/a.

<sup>9</sup> Thomas Risse Kapen, “Collective Identity in a Democratic Community: The Case of NATO”, in J.P. Katzenstein, ed., *The Culture of National Security* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), 395 and Heiner Hanggi and Fred Tanner, *Promoting Security Sector Governance in the EU's Neighbourhood*, Chaillot Paper no. 80 (Paris: Institute for Security Studies, 2005), 23.

<sup>10</sup> “Report on the Democratic Control of the Armed Forces”, Council of Europe, European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission), Study no. 389/2006, Strasbourg 23 April 2008.

assessments. However, under the conditions of today's Turkey, it would not be convincing to approach the civil-military relations with an emphasis on Turkey-EU relations. EU membership, which is looming on the horizon for Turkey, has played an important role for the 2002-2007 reforms being accepted both by the government and the soldiers. In recent years some EU countries (primarily France and Germany) have displayed a strong opposition towards Turkey's membership into the EU, thus impairing the negotiation process. As a result, the influence of the EU over Turkey, and the appeal towards the union, has considerably decreased. It is difficult to say that the EU has played a significant role in the latest developments towards the democratization of the civil-military relations. It would be much more appropriate to see the driving force for the democratization of the civil-military relations in broader international environments and internal social-political dynamics.<sup>11</sup> Despite all this, it should be noted that maintenance of the cultural and political communication with the EU is important for the democratization of the country.

The sources mentioned above base the civil-military relations on certain (sine qua non for these relations) basic principles. The goal of these principles is to draw a normative framework so that the so-called relations are democratically maintained. Without such a framework, it is not plausible to maintain civil-military relations on a democratic ground. Nevertheless, the scope of this framework stands blank. It waits to be filled in compliance with the historical, political-social features and problems that are particular to each country, without ruining or constraining the democratic framework. The reformist legislation should be taken into account under the light of these principles.<sup>12</sup> In other words, these basic principles do not propose a certain democratic civil-military relations model. The liberal-democratic regimes do not have any joint model as such. The same thing applies to the EU countries as well. Each and every country has its own order of civil-military relations. In addition to this, every democratic country develops its own model under the framework of the so-called basic principles, regardless of the models which are developed quite unique to themselves.

These basic principles could be summarized as follows:<sup>13</sup>

1. Distribution of authority among the organs of state should be explicitly stated in the constitution and the public law. For instance, without any ambiguity, the following

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<sup>11</sup> Ali L. Karaosmanoğlu and Behice Özlem Gökakın, "The Forgotten Dimensions of the Civil-Military Relations in Turkey", *International Relations*, volume 7, no.27 (Fall 2010), 29-50. (Ali L. Karaosmanoğlu ve Behice Özlem Gökakın, "Türkiye'de Sivil-Asker İlişkisinin Unutulan Boyutları", *Uluslar arası İlişkiler*, cilt 7, sayı 27 (Güz 2010), 29-50.

<sup>12</sup> Anne Aldis and Magret Drent, eds. *Common Norm and Good Practices of Civil-Military Relations in the EU*, (Groningen: CESS, 2008), 7. Also see ibid, Peter Volten and Magriet Drent, "Civil Direction of the Military: Redefining the Balance in France, Germany, Romania and the United Kingdom", p. 15-38.

<sup>13</sup> Marco Carnovale, "NATO Partners and Allies: Civil Military Relations and Democratic Control of the Armed Forces", *NATO Review* vol.45, no.2 (March 1997), 33; and H. Hanggi and F. Tanner, ibid., 15.

provisions should be explicitly designated by the constitution and the acts: duties and authorities of the legislative and executive concerning the military matters, how the appointment of the high ranking commanders will be, which organs will be authorized and with which powers at times of war, peace and states of emergency and who the commander-in-chief will be during such times.

2. Although at first glance, administration and the control of the General Staff and the Service Commands is a military issue, it is in fact a political one. Therefore, this mission is performed by the government through the Department of Defense, which is the highest authority. Decisions related to the security and defense policy and strategy should be prepared by the Department of Defense within which the General Staff and the Service Commands are integrated. Final decisions within this scope should be given by the civil executive branch (President in presidential system; Prime Minister or the cabinet in the parliamentary system) which comes to power through democratic elections. The General Staff, without leaving any room for uncertainty, should be integrated with the executive. Likewise, the executive, without giving any room for uncertainty, should be able to be accountable towards the Parliament concerning all security and defense issues.
3. The legislative branch should have an absolute authority over defense budget, defense expenditure, and an absolute authority for the control of all public properties belonging to the armed forces. This authority should be used effectively with the help of defense specialists and through parliamentary committees and the Court of Accounts. The required transparency should be ensured for an effective control.
4. In order to build the civil-military relations upon a democratic ground, the principle of “single-headed judiciary” should be accepted as a constitutional rule and made applicable. There is no doubt that the military hierarchy will harm the judicial independence. Prof. Dr. Sami Selçuk says that it would be a pointed decision to annul the Military Court of Cassation and the Military High Administrative Court. “It is because the existence of these organs does not comply with the principles of the sole Court of Cassation, and the sole Council of State, which are responsible for the implementation of a sole practice of law.”<sup>14</sup> Besides, exclusion of the Supreme Military Council’s decisions from the civil control of the judiciary does not comply with democratic regime and the rule of law.<sup>15</sup>

In brief, it is necessary for both the soldiers and the civil authorities to accept and internalize the basic principle that the final word in any field –be it military or civil- in times of war or

<sup>14</sup> Sami Selçuk, *Improving the Judiciary*, Report No: 10 (İstanbul: BILGESAM, 2010), 62. (Sami Selçuk, *Yargının İyileştirilmesi/Düzeltilmesi*, Rapor No:10 (İstanbul: BİLGESAM, 2010), 62.

<sup>15</sup> *Ibid.*, 50.

peace, *always* belongs to the civil authority that comes to power through democratic elections. Another requirement of the democratic framework is the accountability of soldiers towards the civil authority. The democratic framework of the civil-military relations would be lacking unless the legal ground is regulated under the light of these four basic principles.

Apart from the afore-mentioned four principles, public opinion and civil society should participate in the process of control. It is only in this way that control would flow democratically. Likewise, political parties, media, think-tanks and universities play important roles in informing the public about defense matters.<sup>16</sup>

## **Two Basic Uncertainties in Legislation**

An explicit constitutional framework is of utmost importance for the control of the armed forces. Duties and authorities of the armed forces, the confines of the soldier's autonomous sphere, the state organs' authority of control on soldiers and the related control mechanisms shall be determined by the related legislation. Despite the reforms that have been performed so far, in the current legal order, there is no explicitness regarding the democratic control of these matters. This uncertainty stands out especially on two basic issues: duties and authorities of the office of the commander-in-chief and the armed forces in internal security.

### **Office of the Commander-in-Chief**

According to Turkey's current constitution, there is a large uncertainty about to whom the office of the commander-in-chief belongs. The 117<sup>th</sup> article of the constitution says that "the office of the Commander-in-Chief is inseparable from the spiritual existence of the Turkish Grand National Assembly." Such a symbolic clause is followed by the provision that this office is represented by the President of Republic. In other words, duties and powers of the Office of the Commander-in-Chief are given to the President of Republic who has no political responsibility during times of peace. The 3<sup>rd</sup> paragraph of the same article reads "The Chief of the General Staff is the commander of the Armed Forces, and, in time of war exercises the duties of Commander-in-Chief on behalf of the President of the Republic." If there is any transfer of authority here, shouldn't there be a declaration of intention of the President or a legal procedure in this sense? Or that transfer of authority appears itself (automatically) in time of war? The current constitution of Turkey cannot answer these questions. However, the 117<sup>th</sup> article gives the responsibility to the government: "the Council of Ministers shall be responsible to the Turkish Grand National Assembly for national security and for the preparation of the Armed Forces for the defense of the country." The same article states that "The Chief of the General Staff shall be responsible to the Prime Minister in the exercise

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<sup>16</sup> Hanggi and Tanner, *ibid.*, 15.

of his duties and powers.” Nevertheless, “being responsible to the Prime Minister” does not mean “dependence” on the Prime Minister or the government. It does not clarify whether “the final word” belongs to the Council of Ministers or to the Prime Minister. It does not give any clear idea about the government’s –which is the main branch bearing the political responsibility- “politically orienting” and “controlling” the Armed Forces. There is not any other legislation that answers such questions.

Furthermore, the 104<sup>th</sup> article of the current constitution further complicates this problem of authority. This article grants the President of Republic with the power of deciding on the mobilization of the Turkish Armed Forces. The same article authorizes the President to proclaim martial law or state of emergency, and to issue decrees having the force of law, in accordance with the decisions of the Council of Ministers under his or her chairmanship. These regulations debilitate civil-military relations in some respects. Since they mix the orders in the presidential system with those of the parliamentary system, duties and authorities do not act in parallel to each other. Since it does not give the command of the Armed Forces to the political authority, these current regulations deprive the armed forces of political guidance. Similarly, under the current legal system, the Armed Forces are virtually separated from the executive power, rendering it an independent constitutional institution. The armed forces needs political objectives and orientations that are in line with these objectives alike, while they are getting prepared for their duties and performing their duties including the defense of their country. This could be most effectively realized through a close and constant collaboration between the civil government and the armed forces in times of war and peace. At this point, it is of crucial significance to combine the civil government with the armed forces (the Chief of the General Staff and Service Commands) under a single organization.

Which organ of state runs the Office of the Commander-in-Chief differs according to the type of the democratic system. In the presidential systems or semi-presidential systems, the duties and power of the Commander-in-Chief are executed by the President, whereas in the parliamentary systems, these duties and powers belong either to the Prime Minister or to the Council of Ministers. The best examples of these distinct systems could be seen in the United States (US) and the United Kingdom (UK). These duties and powers could be transferred to the Chief of the General Staff in time of war for a certain period of time. However, the transfer of these duties and powers should be realized with the explicit declaration of intention by the civil political authority, which is the owner of these duties and powers. For the complete execution of this proceeding, the approval of the Turkish Grand National Assembly may be needed as well. However, transfer of the Office of the Commander-in-Chief to the Chief of the General Staff does not require the abolition or suspension of the civil control processes.

## Internal and External Security

All democratic states accept that the Armed Forces have to ensure the internal security mission along with the external security mission. The report prepared by Venice Commission of the European Council (report on the *Democratic Control of the Armed Forces*, Strasbourg, April 23<sup>rd</sup>, 2008) external and internal security missions are stated as follows:

External security missions: defense against external threats, collective self-defense within the scope of the 51<sup>st</sup> article of the Charter of the United Nations (as the member of the NATO) and under the light of the UN resolutions, the use of military force with the purposes of crisis management, maintenance of peace, establishment of peace, humanitarian intervention and rescue operations.

Internal security missions: When necessary aiding the internal security forces such as: the police and gendarmerie for the maintenance of the public order, fight against terrorist groups, (when required) protection of the public buildings and institutions, protection of the borders, marine spaces and the air space, rescue operations and other humanitarian aid operations during natural disasters. In the vast majority of the democratic countries, the armed forces are included in the protection of the internal security only with the purpose of aiding the internal security forces. The same case applies to the fight against terror. However, it is quite natural that if the terrorist activities are not restricted to the cities but spread to the rural areas as well, in such a country as Turkey, it is inevitable to make a broader use of the armed forces.

To sum up, in each and every country, including the democratic regimes, armed forces are used with the purpose of the protection of the public order and the fight against terror. Within the scope of the protection of the public order and the fight against terror, there also lie some measures of protection and deterrence by force when the political regime of a country is under the threat of a change. The usage of the TAF for such purposes has nothing to contradict with democracy as long as its usage is decided by the authorized bodies in the Constitution. The provisions on “state of emergency” and “martial law” in the articles 119-122 of Turkey’s Constitution regulate this issue. The problem here derives from the interpretation of the 35<sup>th</sup> article of the Turkish Armed Forces Internal Service Law.

The first regulation concerning the issue took place in the Army Internal Service Law of 1935. The article 34 of this law stipulates the duty of the army in this way:

“The duty of the army is to protect Turkish homeland and the Republic of Turkey which is set in the Constitution Law<sup>17</sup> ...”

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<sup>17</sup> The first constitution accepted by the Turkish Grand National Assembly in 20 January of 1921.

When this article is considered within the constitutional framework, it refers to the protection of the Republic of Turkey against internal and external threats. The army shall execute this duty within the scope of the constitutional framework, with the decision of the civil authority and under its control alike. From the constitutional (and democratic) interpretation of this article, one cannot infer that the army is granted the power to ex-officio intervention in the proceeding of the political regime or to make a military coup d'état. However, after 1960 Turkish coup d'état, in order to legitimize this coup and the following interventions, this article has started to be interpreted in this way.<sup>18</sup> Following the 1960 Turkish coup d'état, this article was turned into the article 35 of the Turkish Armed Forces Internal Service Law by the National Unity Committee on January 4<sup>th</sup>, 1961. The only change in the new article was the replacement of the words "military" and "constitution law" with the "Turkish Armed Forces" and "constitution" respectively.

As a result of the broad interpretation of the 35<sup>th</sup> and 36<sup>th</sup> articles, such a picture appears in which the Turkish Armed Forces is empowered to make ex-officio decisions and act accordingly and to make preparations in accordance with the possibility of such an "arbitrary" decision and action. In order to block this anti-democratic interpretation which allows for coup d'états and "custody", Article 35 has to be either annulled or amended in a way that would not lead to such broad interpretations. Within the scope of such a change, it would not be enough to put an emphasis on "the democratic constitutional system" or the "functionality of the democratic parliamentary system." It is because of the fact that decision makers in these articles are not explicitly stated and it should be clearly stated that the Turkish Armed Forces are not empowered to ex-officio decision making and acting. In this respect, if the purpose is to retain Article 35, a statement such as "it depends on the decision of the Council of Ministers and the approval of the Turkish Grand National Assembly for the Turkish Armed Forces to be able to protect the Republic".

## Duties and Powers of the Legislative

In democracies, the highest organ that represents both people and the state is parliament. If parliament does not have the power to effectively control the executive (and the executive organs), then it means that democracy is lame. If a country whose security sector (especially its armed forces) is not controlled by their parliament, that country cannot be called as the truly democratic country. Such a power share on the state level is one of the elements of the separation of powers.

The most important mechanism through which the parliament controls the executive is the budget. Since the taxes received from citizens form the base of the budget, the parliament is

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<sup>18</sup> Hikmet Sami Türk, "Article 35 of the Turkish Armed Forces Internal Service Law, *Cumhuriyet* –Turkish daily newspaper- (14 September 2010), 14.

responsible for controlling the budget in the name of people. The American principle “taxation without representation” clearly expresses that without representation, taxation can not be performed. It should also be noted that, in the vast majority of the countries, the defense budget constitutes the major part of the state spending.

The laws are needed for the execution of the security affairs and the solution of the problems. Parliaments are responsible for the making of these laws. These laws are drawn from the legal framework of the security and defense administration. Reform in the security sector, and in this scope, restructuring of the civil-military relations on a democratic ground could be realized through the parliament.

Parliament is the organ that establishes the closest contact with people. Members of the parliament could discuss the views and concerns of the citizens related to security and defense in the parliament, attracting the attention of the government to these views and concerns. Likewise, members of the parliament could reflect the concerns of the citizens to the laws and policies on security and defense.<sup>19</sup>

Parliamentary commissions that are specialized in the effective supervision and control of the security, with defense sectors playing highly important roles in this scope. Civilian specialists should work at these commissions as either members or consultants. These commissions are given the right and the power to search and inquire the activities of the related executive organs. Giving this right and the duty to these commissions is inevitable for the legislative to perform the task of inspection. The commissions, with the purpose of informing the members of the parliament, prepare reports and give advice related to the items on the agenda.

The functions of the parliaments with regard to defense could be stated as follows: to assign the Commander-in-Chief or approve his assignment, to debate over the security policy and accept it, to discuss about the budget and approve it, to audit whether the military expenditure is done in compliance with law and whether or not it is “proper”, to review the arms supply projects and/or approve them, to assign the supreme military council members or to approve them, to accept the laws on defense, to approve the decisions on sending soldiers abroad and accepting such soldiers to the country, to approve the international agreements and alliances, to decide on the use of the military forces in domestic security missions or to approve such decisions (such as state of emergency and martial law).

The Turkish Grand National Assembly executes most of these missions. There are some points to be emphasized in the sense of democratization. The Turkish Grand National

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<sup>19</sup> *Parliamentary Oversight of the Security Sector* (Geneve: DCAF, 2003), 18-19.

Assembly could play a role in the appointment of the Commander-in-Chief and other high ranking commanders and when the Turkish Armed Forces is needed to ensure internal security. However, there are certain fields in which the parliamentary control is rather weak such as the ex-post and ex-ante control of the defense expenditures and the passing of the security strategy from the Turkish Grand National Assembly.

## **Budgeting**

Defense budgeting practices of the democratic countries vary from one to another. However, the main principle is this: The executive proposes and the parliament disposes.<sup>20</sup> Under this main principle, practices differ from one to another. The control of the parliament over the defense budget changes quite often in parallel with the accuracy and comprehensiveness of the knowledge it acquires about security and defense. Moreover, the expertise and skills of the related commissions, members of parliament and advisors are rather important in this sense. Above all, the degree of authority of the parliament about budgeting should be taken into account as well.

In some democratic regimes, the parliament has the power to directly change the budget. For instance, in the US, their congress holds such power and it can also prepare a totally new proposal for defense budget. The budget presented by the president does only have the characteristics of a draft and does not have any binding characteristics. The congress has a complete and strict control over the Ministry of Defense. Likewise, the Ministry of Defense is accountable for any detail towards the congress. There is a great need for qualified specialists and for the establishment of grounds for powerful supervision within the parliament.

Additionally, in European countries such as Germany and Denmark, the parliament has the power to make changes in the presented budget. However, it does not have the power to prepare a new budget. In the UK, the authority of the parliament on the budget is rather limited. It can decrease the items in defense budget, yet it cannot add new items to the budget. Even making such small changes has been traditionally complicated because of the laws of procedure applied so far in the parliament. In general, the British defense budget is approved or rejected *as a whole*. Although the powers of the parliament over the budget are quite limited in the United Kingdom, the parliament may at times enter into somehow harsh discussions with regard to the supervision of the defense expenditures. Likewise, it conducts searches and inquiries as such and prepares reports that are open to public. Governments, in general, take into account the advice and work of the parliament, feeling the need to prepare their future defense budgets under the light of this work and advice.

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<sup>20</sup> Venice Commission Report, parags. 163-171.

At first glance, the situation in Turkey may look like the one in the United Kingdom. It can even be said that the control of the parliament over the defense budget is bigger in Turkey. The Parliament's Planning and Budget Commission and General Assembly have the authority to approve the budgetary proposal and even to make amendments. However, this authority is not used properly. The budget is approved almost automatically in the related commissions and the General Assembly. However, as of the second half of the 2000s, it can be said that there have been some tendencies to decrease the defense budget in the parliament. The reason why budget control is limited could be explained by the lack of interest and the lack of knowledge of the members of the parliament concerning the security and defense issues, rather than lack of authority. When the interest towards the issues such as security and defense increases among the members of the parliament, it could be said that the control of the parliament over the budget will be handled more seriously.

### **Defense Expenditures**

In democratic regimes, after the acceptance of the budget, parliaments start to conduct ex-post controls on the expenditures that have been conducted in accordance with the budget. Parliaments receive support from an independent institution (such as the Court of Accounts in Turkey) during the practice of this control. This independent institution investigates whether the expenditures from the defense budget are legally and efficiently carried out, preparing reports to be presented to the parliament. Furthermore, taking into account the similar elements, it prepares reports on the supply and establishment projects of the Ministry of Defense and presents these reports to the parliament. The UK, the US and some EU countries can be shown as among the countries where this process flows most effectively and smoothly. Furthermore, in Germany, Holland and Poland, defense supply and establishment contracts that exceed €26 million have to be approved by the defense commissions of the parliament. In Turkey's recent years, tenders of defense and arms supply have been one of the sub-problems of the civil-military relations. In a parallel fashion, it is observed that the influence of the government on the tender of defense has considerably increased. However, such a progress cannot be regarded as adequate in any sense. Required legal regulations that ensure the active participation of the Turkish Grand National Assembly in this process should be made.

One of the weakest points of the parliamentary control is seen in defense expenditures. Since 2003, there has been remarkable progress made in this field. The accounts of the Defense Industry Support Fund and the Turkish Armed Forces Foundation have been incorporated in the defense budget and opened to the control of the Court of Accounts and the Parliament. Besides, the Turkish Court of Accounts has been given the power to control the public properties that are within the inventory of the Turkish Armed Forces. These changes have, to a certain extent, led to an increase of transparency in defense. However, an amendment related to the release of the reports of the Turkish Court of Accounts to the

public opinion was made on the law of the Turkish Court of Accounts. This amendment required that the release of these reports, which are on the public properties within the inventory, shall depend on the regulations that will be passed in line with the views of the related public administration (namely the Turkish Armed Forces). In other words, this matter has eventually been left to the assessment of the Turkish Armed Forces within the scope of “military secret” (the scope of which has traditionally been fairly wide).

There are also certain restrictions in the law of the Turkish Court of Accounts regarding the performance control. The Turkish Court of Accounts cannot question the political goals that are set by the public administration (such as those of the Turkish Armed Forces). In other saying, it cannot perform any control over the suitability of these goals. In fact, this is a correct approach because of the fact that this is at the discretion of the executive. In democratic regimes, it should be in the parliament where the policies of the government are discussed and questioned. It should not be the Court of Accounts that is in charge of controlling the suitability of the political targets.

Nevertheless, the Court of Accounts should be able to control whether the public institutions (and the Turkish Armed Forces) make efficient and effective spending in accordance with the goals set by the government (but without questioning these goals). In order to ensure the effective implementation of this duty (which is of utmost importance for the smooth democratic regime), the obstacles the Turkish Court of Accounts face before the Turkish Grand National Assembly (and the related commissions of the parliament) should be overcome while ideally maintaining transparency. However when it comes to security and defense, TAF is expected to get prepared to be able to most effectively fulfill its duties. This time, the principles of operating efficiently and economically, to a certain extent, become of secondary importance. The armed forces cannot be seen as a company. This is not something particular to Turkey; but instead it derives from the security concerns that exist in any society and state. Within the scope of defense controls, this matter of fact should be taken into consideration. Likewise, the principle of “*effectiveness*” (the Armed forces being active and ready for service and for the realization of the expected result from a certain operation) should be further emphasized. In order to perform such a control in the best way possible, military and civilian security and defense specialists have to collaborate with each other.

### **Control of the Politics**

As it was stated before, it would not be right for the Court of Accounts to politically control the executive. If it controls the executive, this will result in the violation of the discretionary power of the executive. On the contrary, it is quite usual for the parliament to control and question the policies of the government in democratic regimes. Within this framework, security and defense policies and practices should be controlled and questioned by the

Turkish Grand National Assembly as well. This is an important practice of democracy, not only for the “suitability” assessments of the defense expenditures but also for actually deciding whether or not the policy of the government is appropriate. Nevertheless, the Turkish Grand National Assembly has been considerably delayed in its efforts, opportunities and capabilities concerning this matter. The underlying reason for this is that the scope of the concept of the military secret has been largely defined and thus it has always been difficult to reach the required information. Additionally, this retardation also derives from the lack of interest and lack of knowledge of the people who are in a position of control. There also lies such a reality that transparency in Turkey is lethargic in development. There is also a need for the rearrangement of the legislation which regulates the briefing under the light of democratic fundamentals. However, all members of the parliament cannot be expected to be well-equipped with the knowledge to deal with defense issues. Therefore, there is a growing need for security and defense specialists and the specialized parliamentary commissions.

The Turkish Grand National Assembly does not yet have a role in the preparation of the National Security Policy Document. This document, which deals with the interests and targets of the general security and defense, is neither discussed in the TGNA nor distributed to the members of the parliament. The document is prepared by the Secretary-General of the National Security Council in coordination with the other related institutions. Upon its acceptance by the National Security Council (NSC), it is approved by the government. In the past, soldiers were active in the NSC and the Secretary-General of the National Security Council, the civilians were not quite interested in the security issues, highlighting that there was lack of knowledge on these issues. All of these factors combined resulted in concerns that the government had not been active enough in the preparation of this document until quite recently. However, it is clear that, with the changes in the structure of the National Security Council and the Secretary-General of the National Security Council, contributions of the Council of Ministers in the preparation of the new document have increased. Within this context, it is known that the government has made some remarkable changes in the content of the 2011 National Security Policy Document.<sup>21</sup>

## **Integrated Ministry of National Defense**

The Turkish General Staff, with the 1961 Constitution that was written under the military government right after the May 27<sup>th</sup>, 1960 coup d'état, became accountable to the Prime Ministry instead of the Ministry of National Defense. As a justification of such a change, “the need to exclude the Turkish Armed Forces from politics” was stated. However, in all democratic countries, it is a generally accepted practice that the General Staff reports to the Ministry of Defense. This is also accepted by the NATO, OSCE and the European Council, of

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<sup>21</sup> Sabah -Turkish daily newspaper- (4 February 2011), 21

which Turkey is the member. It is a debated issue as of the early 2000s that the General Staff will start reporting to the Ministry of National Defense. It is also emphasized in the EU assessment reports on Turkey and it is deemed necessary to place civil military relations on a democratic ground. However, this approach should be questioned. Is it really necessary, democracy wise, for the Turkish General Staff to be dependent on the Ministry of National Security rather than the Prime Ministry? Wouldn't it be dependent on the civil authority, which comes to power through elections, in both cases? So in both cases isn't the sine qua non of democracy actualized?

Here, it does not imply that if the TAF is not dependent on the Prime Ministry, it will not intervene in the political parties, will not try to make the civilian authority accept its own views by force or vice versa. This can be seen in the past experiences of Turkey as well. Additionally, it is not possible to exclude the military decisions, practices, operations, internal and external perceptions of threat and defense strategies from political life and separate them from political targets. Especially in today's Turkey, political field and military field have been more closely intertwined compared to past. From now on, in Turkey, the soldier needs political orientation more than ever, while the politicians are in need of the advices of the soldier alike.

In order to take the most incisive decisions, to attain effective and efficient strategies, there is a dire need for civil-military cooperation along with democratic civil-military relations. Debates in Turkey, the constitutions that have so far come into force, and the related legislation have all ignored the problem in civil-military cooperation. It cannot be said that solution to this difficult problem, which requires much time to solve, has been found in all democratic regimes, either. Despite some problems at times, it is mainly the US and the United Kingdom that come first among the countries in which this civil-military cooperation has proceeded well. The legal and institutional basis of these countries provide the ground for the civil-military cooperation to progress. Because of the below mentioned reasons, Turkey is in need of such a basis.<sup>22</sup> However, even if this legal and institutional basis could be established as a result of the constitutional and other legislative changes in Turkey, it would not be realistic to expect this to start working properly in a short period of time. For the proper working of the system, there is a need for well-educated civil staff in the fields of security and defense in the executive as much as it is needed in the legislative. After the Cold War, although interest in international relations studies and foreign policy analyses have increased both within the universities and think-tanks in Turkey, the same progress has not been seen in security and strategy research. Within this scope, while the civil capacity is waiting to increase, there could be steps taken for the establishment of the legal and

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<sup>22</sup> Final Export Report of a Task Force Chaired by Win van Eekelen (Rapporteur: David Greenwood) on "Turkish Civil-Military Relations and thr EU: Preparations for Continuing Convergence" in *Governance and the Military: Perspectives for Change in Turkey* (Groningen: CESS, 2006), 21-68.

institutional basis for this end. It will of use to take into consideration this issue during the preparation of the constitution.

“The superiority of the civilian authority” does not only imply the non-intervention of the military into the politics, but also the power of the civilian authority, which comes to power through elections, to say the final word in any political issues (including both production and implementation of the national security policy and the strategy.) Additionally, this power also includes the control of any military activity by the government and the accountability of the TAF to the government. In the final analysis, it is the government that is responsible for any military decision and act towards the TGNA. In order to put into practice this democratic rule, the General Staff (Service Commands) should not be regarded as an autonomous institution, separate from the government, but instead should be integrated with the government. This integration is realized by the Ministry of National Defense in democratic regimes. Within such a regulation, neither the civilians nor the military could be excluded from the decision process. Civil and military contributions are equally important and necessary. In the decision formation process in this sense, the civil and military specialists shall be in collaboration with each other within the Ministry of the National Defense. Decision drafts that come out with the contributions of the Chief of General Staff and the Minister of National Defense shall be submitted either to the Council of Ministers or to the Prime Minister for the ultimate decisions. Such a structuring within the Ministry of National Defense will certainly boost civil-military collaboration. However, this will not completely remove the disagreements. Implementation of a system that is similar to the one in the United Kingdom could be adopted for the overcome of the disagreements. In the United Kingdom, the Chief of General Staff (being at the same time Chief of the Army) when he deems appropriate, could skip the Minister of the Defense and go directly and refer a certain issue to the Prime Minister. However, it should be noted that this special power that is granted to the General Staff in the United Kingdom should be rarely used and not abused in this country.

## **Summary and Conclusion**

With the purpose of maintaining the civil-military relations in compliance with the standards of the democratic countries in Turkey, reform packages were accepted and the powers of the TAF and its privileged position were considerably restricted in the 2000s. Despite these reforms, it is seen that in Turkey, compared to other democratic regimes, certain basic changes in this sense have not yet been implemented. This report intends to clarify these matters and to propose some suggestions regarding this concern.

It is necessary to implement four basic principles so that civil-military relations in Turkey could be maintained on a democratic ground:

1. Explicit distribution of the duties and the powers to the related organs in the Constitution.
2. Effective control of the budget and all expenditures of the defense organization by the parliament.
3. Effective control of the General Staff and the Service Commands by the government and orienting them in line with the political aims. This could be most effectively realized only through the Ministry of Defense and an organization that promotes civil-military collaboration within the ministry.
4. The judiciary being single-headed and the annulment of the supreme military jurisdictions.

These principles draw a democratic framework. The content of this framework depends on the countries themselves. It is for this reason that there is not only one model for civil-democratic relations. Each country shall build their own models in compliance with their own experiences and needs.

There are three basic impediments for the creation of a platform for democratic and functional civil-military relations:

1. Tendency to see the concept of “military secret” broader than in actuality. This widely seen tendency restricts transparency and, as a result, effective civil control and the accountability of the military and the government.
2. Deficiency in civil specialists prevents both the parliament and the Ministry of National Defense from effectively acting and it does not also allow for civil-military collaboration. Development of the superiority of the civilian authority depends on the abilities of the civilian politicians and on the knowledge and skills of the civil staff that will collaborate with the military.
3. Tendency of the military to broaden its autonomous sphere to the extent of violating the democratic framework. The superiority of the civil authority, on the one hand, requires a significant decrease of the powers and privileges of the military. On the other hand, for the political stability, it is of utmost importance to minimize the dissention between the civil authorities and the military.

This is a dilemma that is difficult to resolve. In order to overcome it, civilian authority and the military should act cautiously. It is of utmost importance for the parties to bear confidence towards each other. Relations should be based on cooperation and confidence not on the conflict. One of the prominent names among American liberal intellectuals, Harvard University professor Joseph S. Nye, Jr., says that the liberal tradition imposes some

moral responsibilities on the civilians and the military.<sup>23</sup> There are certain basic principles that derive from this liberal tradition and that the soldiers and the politicians should always keep these in mind. It can be said that these basic principles facilitate the civil-military relations of any country. The Armed Forces should acknowledge the rule of law and that “the final word” always belongs to the civilian authority. Furthermore, as one of the requirements of the executive, it should be wholly aware of the fact that it has to account for its actions and bear respect for the political authority. The members of the TAF should believe that complying with these rules is not the implication of weakness, but instead the requirement of the professionalism and the commitment of democratic republic. In order to achieve such perception of democracy and the consolidation of democracy in Turkey, there is vast need for a change in the military training programs. Within these programs, the emphasis should be on democratic values and the democratic civil-military relations. It should be noted that in today’s world, the advanced armies have come to be so since they have been able to internalize those democratic values. Moreover, the Armed Forces, although dependent on the civilian authority, should not be bound to any political party or group. It should not be influenced by the efforts of the political parties, media and the political groups which may attempt to direct it.

Apart from the responsibilities of the soldier, the civilians also bear liabilities towards the soldier. The civil authorities should accept that the armed forces are the legitimate and the obligatory institutions of the democratic regime and shall bear respect towards it. The civil authority should meet the required financial obligation of the tasks it itself assigned upon the armed forces. Civilians (including civil societies) should improve themselves on such issues as defense problems and the military culture. There is such a reality that in Turkey, since the acceptance of the multiple-party system, there have always been some civilians who tended to use soldiers for their political benefit. For the consolidation of democracy in Turkey, this tendency should be removed.

Anytime, be it in time of war, peace or in the periods of change and transformation as it is in today’s Turkey, civil-military cooperation has always been of utmost importance for taking the correct decisions and implementing them accordingly. Internal and external atmosphere of today’s world promotes cooperation and the democratic transformation of the soldier in Turkey. The army’s role in Turkey’s foreign security is increasing day-by-day, along with its role in internal security. Turkey has attached much importance to and participates in peace operations, NATO’s international operations and rescue operations. In a parallel fashion, the international dimension of the Kurdish issue and the PKK (outlawed Kurdistan Worker’s

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<sup>23</sup> Joseph S. Nye, Jr., “Epilogue: The Liberal Tradition”, in Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner, eds., *Civil-Military Relations and Democracy* (Baltimore: the John Hopkins University Press, 1996), 152-153. See also for details: “Soldier and the Politics in the 2000s: the Turkish Army Between the Controlled Change and Status quo”, *SETA Analysis* (February 2010), 23-27. [Tanel Demirel, “2000’li Yıllarda Asker ve Siyaset: Kontrollü Değişim ile Statüko Arasında Türk Ordusu”, *SETA Analiz* (Şubat 2010), 23-27.]

Party) has gained more importance. Under such an atmosphere, Turkey has focused more on international security problems. In recent years, Turkey's foreign policy and its security policy have come to be multi-dimensional and multi-lateral, especially with the rise of the people's movements in the Arab world. All combined, have shifted the attention of the soldier from internal politics to international security. Besides, since all of these developments have put the civilian political thought and contributions to the fore, they all promote civil-military cooperation. Under such an atmosphere, it could be expected that the relatively less problematic relations will positively contribute to the democratic transformation of the soldier in Turkey.

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## **Journals**

Wise Strategy Journal Vol. 1, No 1, Fall 2009

Wise Strategy Journal Vol 1, No 2, Spring 2010

Wise Strategy Journal Vol 1, No 3, Fall 2010

Wise Strategy Journal Vol 2, No 4, Spring 2011

## **Wise Talks**

### **Wise Talk-1: Turkish – Azerbaijani Relations**

Interview with Assoc. Prof. Atilla Sandıklı

Elif Kutsal

### **Wise Talk -2: Nabucco Project**

Interview with Arzu Yorkan

Elif KUTSAL-Eren Okur

### **Wise Talk -3: Nuclear Iran**

Interview with Ret. Minister-Ambassador İlder Türkmen

Elif Kutsal

### **Wise Talk -4: European Union**

Interview with Dr. Can Baydarol

Eren OKUR

### **Wise Talk -5: Constitutional Change**

Interview with Assoc. Prof. Atilla Sandıklı

Merve Nur Sürmeli

### **Wise Talk -6: Turkey- Israel Relations in Recent Period**

Interview with Ret. Ambassador Özdem Sanberk

Merve Nur Sürmeli

### **Wise Talk -7: UN Sanctions and Iran**

Interview with Assoc. Prof. Abbas Karaağaçlı

Sina KISACIK

### **Wise Talk -8: Missile Defense Systems and Turkey**







Interview with Assoc. Prof. Atilla Sandıklı

Eren Okur

### **Wise Talk -9: Today's and Tomorrow's Developing and Changing Turkish Navy**

Interview with Ret. Admiral Salim Dervişoğlu

Emine Akçadağ



**WISE MEN CENTER FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES**  
Mecidiyeköy Yolu Caddesi Celil Ağa İş Merkezi No: 10 Kat: 9 Daire: 36-38  
Mecidiyeköy/Şişli/İSTANBUL  
Web: [www.bilgesam.org](http://www.bilgesam.org) e-mail: [bilgesam@bilgesam.org](mailto:bilgesam@bilgesam.org)  
Tel: +90 212 217 65 91-92 Faks: +90 212 217 65 93