Resulting from their WWI loss, the Ottoman Empire suffered humiliating land partitioning of what was left of their empire, encouraging Turkish nationalists to wrangle back Anatolian and Eastern Thracian lands during the War for Independence. As the Ottoman Empire staggered into the 20th century, worn down by expansionism and regional conflicts, it took its remnants and salvaged what would be known as today’s Turkish Republic founded in 1923.

Only a year prior to Turkey’s new establishment did the Soviet Union take root (in 1922), expanding to territories adjacent to Turkish borders, including today’s Caucasus Republics (Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan) and fellow Turkic nation states in Central Asia. Under the direction of a pro-Western leadership in the form of the late Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, Turkey set out on an internal course of pro-democratic reforms steeped in French-modeled laïcité.

Deeming the Soviet Union and other regional conflicts as not only security threats but also ideological threats, the new Republic subsequently turned inwards to develop itself through reinvention. Finding similar ground with the Americans in terms of a modernism and standing against the ‘Soviet threat,’ Turkey and the United States formed a bond based on ideological and strategic interests. Turkey served as an unofficial barrier against the Soviet Union, but soon after the Union collapsed in 1989, both Turkey and America cooled their relations. Turkey continued to offer its troops for peacekeeping missions around the world, and its Incirlik (American) airbase helped American troops contain former Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein in the early 1990s.

The Turkish-American friendship has experienced its fair share of highs and lows, as the crests and troughs of public opinion in both countries have wavered over several key events. With American assistance, (outlawed Kurdistan Worker’s Party) PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan was captured in Kenya in 1999, supporting the Turkish-American alliance. Relations ramped up again in 2001 after the 9/11 terrorist attacks on American soil, when then-Turkish President Bülent Ecevit became the first leader of a predominantly Muslim country to offer its moral support. Shortly before the attacks, the AKP [Justice and Development Party] was founded, and took power the following year in 2002. But when Turkish Parliament voted ‘no’ in March 1, 2003 to not actively participate in the U.S. invasion of Iraq, Turkish-American relations were at a new low point. Later that year in July, Turkish Special Forces investigating PKK activity in northern Iraq were arrested, hooded, and detained by U.S. military forces, thoroughly embarrassing and aggravating the Turkish government.

Revision Needed: Zero Problems with Certain Neighbors

Davutoğlu’s ‘zero problems with neighbors’ policy is being called into question amidst these recent regional crises. The policy has truly only gained speed in further off regions, such as the Balkans and (north and sub-Saharan) Africa, both of which are enjoying both diplomatic and development assistance from Turkey. While intentions for improved regional relations remain fairly genuine and successful for Davutoğlu, relations with immediate neighbors, however, are rather questionable. EU (European Union) membership talks, once a salient priority for Turkey, have been put on the backburner in light of the EU’s economic crisis and growing regional security concerns. Once warm relations with Syria have rapidly deteriorated. Turkey, which enjoys a free trade agreement with Syria, finds Syrian president Bashar al Assad’s response to domestic turmoil appalling and not in line with international democratic standards, so much so that Turkey endorses sanctions on the Syrian regime. With these relations gradually degrading, another frozen conflict comes to the forefront: the Golan Heights territorial dispute, where Israelis have occupied Syrian lands since 1967. The stalemate with Armenia continues for Turkey, as contentions over borders and genocide recognition leave both countries stuck in their diplomatic tracks. Likely to appease America’s strong Armenian lobby, the Turkish Parliament recently received a resubmitted version of the Armenian-Turkish protocols from the Turkish Council of Ministers. Not only does this move Armenia up the list on the Turkish foreign policy agenda, but it also draws some light to another regional neglected conflict in Turkey’s neighborhood: Nagorno-Karabakh (where Armenian troops have rested on western-Azeri lands since the late 90’s). Turkey’s attempt to mediate this crisis was questioned, given the economic and historical (Turkic) alliance with Azerbaijan. The Cyprus issue gets more attention as it continues to be a barrier for EU negotiations and oil exploration tit-for-tat measures are testing the patience of other powers. To make matters worse, nearly 27 U.S. senators have weighed in on the Cyprus issue, scolding Turkey and instead highlighting the strategic importance of Cyprus. (1) Internally, PKK attacks have been on the rise in Turkey and its border regions, rising tensions enough for Turkish forces to continue cross-border military raids, and asking Americans for drone technology to monitor the situation.

Old Friends, New Problems: The Special Turkish-Israeli Alliance on the Rocks

The hostility between Turkey and Israel has surprised many of the regional actors, as Turkish-Israeli relations have a long history, with Turkey being one of Israel’s only allies in the region. Relations between the two countries started to unravel in 2009, when Turkish Prime Minister Tayyip Erdoğan vocally expressed his strong opposition to the country’s actions at the World Economic Forum in Davos, in terms of Israeli military operations during the Gaza War. Subsequent boycotts of the annual Davos event, true to Erdoğan’s vow to never return, continued in affirmation of the Turkish stance on Israeli actions in the region.

In early 2010, the so-called “lower chair crisis” occurred, in which Turkish ambassador Ahmet Oğuz Çelikkol was publicly humiliated by undiplomatic behavior exhibited by Israeli deputy foreign minister Danny Ayalon.

By mid-2010, the unwarranted and unbalanced retaliation by Israeli troops that intercepted a Turkish Mavi Marmara humanitarian aid ship in international waters and was bound for Gaza has been the key incident highlighting the drop in Turkish-Israeli relations. Nine Turkish volunteers (including one Turkish-American) were killed by Israeli troops in the ship raid, as a result of ‘excessive’ force for protecting a ‘legal’ blockade on Gaza, according to the UN’s contestable ‘Palmer Report.’ (2) The report’s writing committee has been called into question given their respective human rights and conflict resolutions records, as well. Co-currently, the true intentions of the flotilla’s organizers, the IHH (Turkish Humanitarian Relief Foundation) and other supporting international charities, have also been under scrutiny. Apologies have still yet to come from the Israeli side, which has only regretted the loss of life on the ship during the event. Coupled with a weak Israeli response, Turkey grew frustrated with America’s silence on the death of one of their citizens in the flotilla raid. (3) Recent comments from Erdoğan even hint at future humanitarian aid ships being accompanied by Turkish warships for protection. (4) Davutoğlu has boldly stated that American intervention in the Turkish-Israeli fallout isn’t necessary, insisting on a bilateral solution (contingent on an Israeli apology) for the problems between the once-long time allies. Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu’s right-wing Likud party has now found itself without its only (Muslim) ally in the Middle East, increasingly isolating the small country in a region being reshuffled and redefined by the Arab Spring. However, such self-seclusion in its immediate neighborhood hasn’t stopped Israel reaching out further, with the small nation establishing rather fresh relations with states such as Romania and Greece in the Balkans, Turkey’s investment playground. (5) However, as Israel finds itself alone in a still-developing Middle East landscape post-Arab Spring, American Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta has stated that he’s concerned about the military security of Israel, and its’ diplomatic unwillingness to compromise with its’ neighbors.

Grabbing the Brass Ring: Economic Ties Have Never Been Better

Hence, relations between the two countries (Turkey and Israel) continue to tumble, as diplomatic representations have been downgraded, joint-military exercises cancelled, and increased political mud-slinging continues in international arenas. Despite these series of events, the trade volume between the bickering countries has increased to its’ highest level yet, from $2.5 billion in 2009 to $3.5 billion in 2010. (6)

The same steady economic scenario can be seen between Turkey’s now ‘frenemy’ Syria, where the 2009 trade volume between the two countries was $1.8 billion, and rose to $2.2 billion by the end of 2010. (7) Trade with both Israel and Syria, despite the political turmoil, has continued smoothly largely in part to free trade agreements between the countries. In North Africa, Turkish trade volume with troubled former ally Libya topped at $2.36 billion by 2010, estimated to reach nearly $10 billion in the next half decade. (8)

One may wonder how economic ties can remain so prosperous despite diplomatic tensions. Turkey’s AKP party gained strength largely in part to its’ ability to rescue the country from its financial crisis in the early 2000s. By grabbing a steady hold of its economy (which has grown steadily for nine consecutive economic quarters), Turkey now ranks as the 15th strongest economy in the world, and 6th in the European area, surpassing robust global expectations when compared to a European Union staggering from internal economic strife. Although diplomatically, Turkey has been quite vocal about its condemnation of troubled neighborhood, business has (quite literally) continued as usual. Economic strength, and various regional diplomatic successes, has given Turkey the confidence and power to mediate local crises and speak up as the most democratically stable voice of the Middle East.

Dust Off and Tweak Old Initiatives 

Following his inauguration, the first country that American president Barack Obama visited bilaterally was Turkey, highlighting the importance that the Obama administration puts on not only improving America’s image in the Middle East region, but simultaneously recognizing Turkey’s growing regional importance and the two countries’ strategic partnership. The United States was fairly hesitant in responding to the developments in North Africa, also refraining from militarily engaging in yet another costly conflict in a (Muslim) North African country. Instead, the United States watched and acted through third parties, being: Turkish diplomats (to assist with Libyan and Egyptian negotiations) and NATO (of which the United States and Turkey are both members), respectively. With the Palestinian Authority now asking for United Nations (UN) Security Council for member state recognition and the United States almost certain to veto the motion in search of another negotiated solution, the Arab Spring and increasing Israeli seclusion leaves a gap for a possible revival of the failed 2002 Arab Peace Initiative. The proposal, first brought to light during the 2002 Arab League’s Beirut Summit, has also resurfaced in 2007 with the help of Saudi Arabia. Given the uncertainty within the Middle East post-Arab Spring (particularly with fears of undemocratic entities filling empty political power vacuums that the revolutions have left behind), the revival of this initiative would be a timely and healthy step towards ‘starting anew’ in the Middle East. With both the United States and Turkey increasingly fatigued by Israeli’s inflexible diplomacy, Israel will also need to realize that mutual recognition of the right to exist, buoyed by withdrawal to pre-1967 borders and refusal to build more settlements, will be a monumentally progressive step for regional security in a now politically uncertain set of neighboring nation-states.

Quick to Label: A Case of Foot-in-Mouth?

Much like the European Union has been weighed down in jargon like “enlargement fatigue,” Turkey has been bearing the brunt of labels such as practicing a “moderate or political Islam” that as caused Ankara to “shift its axis.” With the exception of the current Turkish-Israeli crisis, Turkish and American politicians have largely seen eye-to-eye on many issues.  America has reaffirmed its pledge to help Turkey’s current battle on its’ southern border with PKK by offering to donate drone technology to Turkish forces. Indeed, by establishing (almost taboo) relations with states like Iran, Turkey has drawn the side-eye from most Western countries, which often stage walkouts whenever Iran’s President Mahmoud Ahmedinejad makes a speech on an international stage. However, despite Turkey’s (nearly 60 year long) membership in NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization], many have recently questioned Turkey’s alliance to the group, especially when Turkey refused to support UN sanctions against Iran. Turkey’s decision to allow its NATO allies to install a radar station on its soil highlights that while Turkey and Iran have enjoyed warmer relations since the AKP government has been in power, the Turkish-Iranian relationship remains rather guarded, with each one wary of the other while prospering from mutual economic trade. Such a military installation, at the dismay of Iranian authorities, should reaffirm the Turkish commitment to regional security. Turkey’s negotiations and rescue efforts of foreign (particularly U.S.) nationals in the Libyan crisis also confirms its support of democratic transformation to its NATO allies.

Despite positive measures taken, Turkish deference on some issues continues to be questioned, even urging various U.S. senators to send a joint letter to the White House worried about Turkey’s “eroding support in Congress” due to Turkey’s new “policy of confrontation.” (9) Although many U.S. senators recognize that the Turkish administration is the only viable entity that can speak to Hamas in terms of Israeli-Palestinian relations, various senators still question Turkey’s value and commitment. (10) This ‘with us or against us’ implication is particularly harmful, as Turkey has chosen to merely progressively engage itself within its troubled region and beyond; Turkey’s unique geopolitical location demands such measures, continuing to make Turkey a reliable strategic ally for the West. Turkey now finds itself challenging its previous image of cultural hegemony in the region, and growing Turkish power in the region is being watched with international scrutiny.

With the Arab Spring now morphing into the Arab Fall, regional alliances are dramatically shifting, global orders being redefined. Turkey hasn’t shifted its axis per se; it has merely up righted itself to enable political elements to equally engage and partake in the country’s new open door negotiation policies. Therefore, stronger demonstrations of American support in helping Turkey with the following are critical during this time: tackling recent resurgence of PKK attacks head-on, filling the EU diplomatic gap by accelerating Cyprus (and thus EU membership talk) negotiations, securing borders and (oil and natural gas) energy sources, and applying greater pressure on Israel to avoid inflammatory behavior (such as the Israeli threat to support PKK rebels ) and resolve the Palestinian question. (11) The Turkish-American alliance has traditionally been characterized on a ‘strategic’ level, with the emphasis being on ensuring regional security. However, confidence building measures must be shown on both sides to maintain this vital transatlantic friendship. 

Notes

(1) Menendez, Robert. “Senators to President Obama: A Strong US-Cyprus

Relationship is an Anchor of U.S. Foreign Policy.” Robert Menendez: United States Senator for New Jersey.

September 23, 2011.

http://menendez.senate.gov/newsroom/press/release/?id=7365bc49-f21e-4613-8f84-b31fb92bd22c.

(2) “Report of the Secretary-General’s Panel of Inquiry on the 31 May 2010 Flotilla Incident.”

September 2011. Authors: Sir Geoffrey Palmer, President Alvaro Uribe, Mr. Joseph Ciechanover Itzhar,

 Mr. Suleyman Ozem Sanberk. Pg. 51. The United Nations.

 http://www.un.org/News/dh/infocus/middle_east/Gaza_Flotilla_Panel_Report.pdf.
(3) “Erdoğan’dan ABD’ye ‘Furkan’ sitemi.”CNNTurk.com. July 12, 2010.

 http://www.cnnturk.com/2010/dunya/07/12/erdogandan.abdye.furkan.sitemi/583022.0/.
(4) “Erdogan: Turkish Warships Will Escort Aid Vessels to Gaza.” Voice of America. September 9, 2011.

 http://www.voanews.com/english/news/europe/Erdogan-Turkish-Warships-

Will-Escort-Aid-Vessels-to-Gaza-129517938.html
(5) Williams, Dan. “For Israel, a Balkan Bloom despite a Palestine Chill.” Reuters.com. July 10, 2011.

 http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/07/10/us-israel-netanyahu-balkans-interview-

idUSTRE7690FW20110710
(6) “Turkey-Israel Economic and Trade Relations: Trade and Investment.”

Republic of Turkey, Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Accessed October 1, 2011.

 http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkey_s-commercial-and-economic-relations-with-israel.en.mfa
(7) “Turkey-Syria Economic and Trade Relations: Trade and Investments.”

Republic of Turkey, Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Accessed October 1, 2011. 

http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkey_s-commercial-and-economic-relations-with-syria.en.mfa
(8) “Turkey-Libya Economic and Trade Relations: Trade and Investments.”

Republic of Turkey, Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Accessed October 1, 2011. 

http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkey_s-commercial-and-economic-relations-with-libya.en.mfa
(9) Rogin, Josh. “Amid Tensions, U.S. and Turkey Move Forward on Missile Defense.”

Foreign Policy.com. September 19, 2011.

http://thecable.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/09/19/amid_tensions_us_and_

turkey_move_forward_on_missile_defense

(10) Yetkin, Murat. “U.S. Senators Deliver Message to PM Erdogan: ‘Turkey Can Convince Hamas.’”

Hurriyet Daily News. July 3, 2011. 

 http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/n.php?n=us-senators-deliver-message-to-pm-erdogan-

8216only-you-can-convince-hamas8217-2011-07-03.
(11) Matthews, Owen. “Turkey’s Tricky Drone Diplomacy.” The Daily Beast, World News. September 13, 2011.

http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2011/09/13/turkey-s-tricky-

drone-diplomacy-with-israel-and-u-s-over-pkk.html.